INTRODUCTION
Business groups account for a significant share of the private sector in several emerging economies (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001) . The presence of such diversified groups makes the effect of group affiliation on firm valuation a relevant issue. The present paper examines this aspect, using a sample of companies for an emerging economy. More specifically, we focus on India as a case study and analyze how group affiliation affects firm valuation, by comparing the market value of group affiliates and stand-alone entities, after controlling for a number of firm characteristics. Is the valuation effect influenced by group-and firm-specific variables? Does the valuation differ for members of large or more diversified groups?
There are several reasons as to why these are important questions and India presents an ideal laboratory for examining these issues. First, in emerging economies such as India, business groups invest in and produce in several industries or product markets rather than a single product line. Khanna and Palepu (1997) found that Indian business groups operate in an average of 3.76 industries. This provides a role for policy in the corporate diversification debate. A second reason is that India is one of the few emerging economies for which a comprehensive and reliable corporate database is available over an extended time span, permitting rigorous statistical analysis. Third, as Khanna and Palepu (1997) remark, firms in India are typically members of only one group, making it possible to cleanly identify the group affiliation of each sample firm.
The findings obtained from the analysis may offer useful implications for the role of group affiliates in attracting external funds in other emerging markets.
An alternate strand of thinking contends that the use of internal capital markets could engender agency problems (Rajan et al., 2000) . Conflicts of interests may arise between different affiliates of the same group or between the controlling family and minority stakeholders, often with significant costs (Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002) . This view of business group, termed expropriation view, suggests that an increase in agency costs due to group affiliation may lower firm value. These agency costs are likely to be especially high when legal institutions are poorly developed. It, therefore, remains a moot question as to which of the aforesaid competing views are likely to be dominant in the Indian context and is a major concern of the paper.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the evolution of Indian business groups against the backdrop of the evolving literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and contains descriptive statistics of the data. We also give a detailed description of the variables we employ in our tests.
Section 4 presents the results of our analysis. The final section concludes.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
Institutional economics conceptualize business groups as organizational responses to environments characterized by poorly functioning markets and institutions. Early research emphasized the way in which business groups develop internal capital markets for efficiently allocating resources. In addition, absent wellfunctioning capital markets, firm diversification was viewed as a way for investors to diversify their investment and contain risks. Research on Japanese keiretsus (Caves and Uekusa, 1976) and Korean chaebols (Chang and Choi, 1988 ) pursued this approach. Subsequent research contended that business groups not only alleviate capital market failures, but also deficiencies in other markets, including product, labor and technology markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) .
A number of studies have dealt with the effects of business groups in the Indian context. Khanna and Palepu (1997) compare the performance of group affiliates and stand-alone companies, using accounting and stock market data on Indian corporates. They conclude that diversified business groups outperform their stand alone peers. Using a cross section of firms in several emerging markets including India, Lins and Servaes (2002) investigate how corporate diversification impacts firm value. They find a significant diversification discount for group affiliated firms. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) explore data from 14 emerging markets to examine the effect of group affiliation on firm profitability. Group firms are found to exert a substantial impact on economic performance, although the magnitude of the impact differs across countries. Lensink et al. (2003) explore whether affiliated firms face less finance constraints on investment than non-affiliated firms and find support in favor of the former. More recently, using data on business groups for 1988-93, Majumdar and Sen (2006) find evidence in favor of rent seeking by Indian business groups.
None of these studies however, examined the intermediation versus expropriation hypothesis of business groups and this is our point of entry into the paper. Accordingly, we examine the expropriation hypothesis which suggests that the increase in agency costs due to group affiliation could impact firm value. Additionally, we ascertain which of the firm-level factors are important in affecting performance of firms.
THE INDIAN SITUATION
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 laid the groundwork for the establishment of industrial policy in independent India. The economic development envisaged by policymakers accorded the "commanding heights" of the economy to the public sector with the private sector being given only a residual role. In effect, the policy exerted multiple controls over private investment that limited areas in which private investors were allowed to operate and also determined the scale of operations, the location of new investments and even the technology employed, a process often described as the license raj. This was buttressed by a highly protective trade policy, often providing tailor-made protection to each sector of industry. The heavily regulated economy also stimulated the prevalence of large diversified business groups. The licensing system led to rent-seeking behavior, enabling firms with best political connections to corner the licenses. Moreover, the restrictions on market share imposed by the relevant Acts of the time induced many companies to diversify into new industries. By 1973, business groups accounted for over a quarter of all joint ventures active in India (Encarnation, 1989) .
The reforms process of the 1990s led to new opportunities and challenges for business groups. On the one hand, the opening of areas earlier reserved for public sector created newer business opportunities, leading to the rise of several new ventures. On the other hand, the abolition of the licensing system and the important substitution programs challenged many of the established business groups. Companies faced intensified competition from both domestic and foreign competitors and suddenly faced the need to restructure and modernize. Several business groups were able to successfully rise to the challenge, while others could not adequately adjust to the new realities.
At the same time, the opening up of capital markets not only created enormous potential of foreign capital, but also faced the Indian companies with new standards of corporate governance. Again, this was a challenge for the business groups. Groups erstwhile dictated by opaque ownership structures and complex networks had to rapidly re-orient them with modern standards of corporate governance were able to benefit from increased access to foreign capital.
This overview of the Indian business history in the second half of the twentieth century indicates that the prevalence of business groups in India is the culmination of a number of factors. Political economy considerations and responses to government regulation tell only a part of the story. Rapid re-orientation to emerging realities and improving best practices in corporate behavior and transparency were equally influential in shaping the success and failure of different business groups.
DATASET AND VARIABLES
The data employed for the study is extracted from the Prowess database (Release 2.5), generated and maintained by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), a leading private think-tank in India.
The Prowess is a firm-level database, akin to the Compustat database for US firms and the Financial Analysis
Made Easy (FAME) database for UK and Irish public and private limited companies. This database is being increasingly employed in the literature for firm-level analysis on Indian industry concerning issues like the effect of foreign ownership on the performance of Indian firms (Chibber and Majumdar, 1999) , the effect of privatization on firm profitability (Gupta, 2005) and the effect of financial liberalization in alleviating financing constraints for manufacturing companies (Ghosh, 2006 ).
The present dataset contains financial information on around 9,800 companies (including 4500 services and construction companies). In addition, if an entity is not listed, it qualifies for inclusion in the database if the average sum of sales and total assets is at least Rs.200 million (≈US $4 million) as per the latest audited financial results. Accordingly, the firms in the sample generally do not include the smallest firms due to the requirements for firms to be included in Prowess. 2 Thus, in effect, the sample is skewed towards large Indian firms. The database contains detailed information on the financial performance of companies culled out from their profit and loss accounts, balance sheets and stock price data. There is also disaggregated information on the equity holding pattern of the firm as also the ownership type of the firm.
In our analysis, since we employ stock price data as a measure of performance, therefore we confine our analysis to listed firms. The first year for which Prowess contains share price data is 1996. Therefore, our sample runs from 1996-2006. In step one, we cull out information on all firms that are listed on the National Stock Exchange. 3 This, in effect, provided us with aggregate information on 801 firms. We subsequently delete a number of firms from the sample. First, we delete firms with extremely mis-recorded data, lowering the sample to 773 firms. In step two, we delete firms with negative observations on some of the relevant variables, such as sales, profits and leverage, further reducing the number of sample firms to 739. We also exclude firms with less than five consecutive years of information on the concerned variables. Finally, to remove the effect of outliers, we winsorize all the firm-level variables at the one percent level in both tails of the distribution. These exclusions reduce the final sample to 700 firms. Owing to missing data for certain years for several firms, we are left with data on 681 firms. These companies, on average, account for four-fifths of sales and over 75% of the market capitalization of all manufacturing companies on which information is provided in Prowess. This procedure has previously been employed by Khanna and Palepu (1997) and thereafter, by Bertrand et al. (2002) and more recently, by Majumdar and Sen (2006) and Gopalan et al. (2007) .
[ Table 1 ]
We measure firm performance in two distinct ways: adjusted Q, a market-based measure of firm value and an accounting measure RoA, a measure of firm profitability. The market-based measure of performance is the proxy for Tobin's q, defined as the aggregate of the market value of equity and market value of debt divided by total assets. However, in India as in many emerging markets, the computation of Tobin's q is rendered difficult primarily because a large proportion of corporate debt is institutional debt which is not actively traded in the debt market. Also, most companies report asset values to historical cost rather than at replacement costs. We, therefore, compute the proxy for Tobin's q, defined as adjusted Q employed in similar studies on India (see for example, Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Ghosh, 2007) by taking the aggregate of the market value of equity and book value of debt in the numerator, scaled by the book value of assets. In line with the literature, RoA is measured as the ratio of net profit to total assets. Table 2 provides the definitions of the variables employed in the analysis.
[Table 2]
The control variables are similar to those employed in earlier studies. More specifically, firm size is measured as the log of total sales. In addition, we control for the firm's growth opportunities by including the annual growth in sales. The debt to asset ratio is included to control for differences in leverage across firms. To capture the uniqueness of a firm's product, we use the ratio of R&D to assets. If a firm offers unique products, consumers may find it difficult to obtain alternatives in case of liquidation; hence, the costs of bankruptcy increase. Finally, we include industry dummies to control for industry-specific effects and year dummies to control for year specific effects.
The main focus of the analysis is to investigate how the valuation effect of group affiliation depends on group characteristics. We construct measures of group size and group diversity. Group size is measured as a count of the number of firms that belong to the same group. In addition to the firm count measure, FIRMC, we also measure the effect of group size on firm value by constructing three dummy variables: FIRMC1, FIRMC2
and FIRMC3. FIRMC1 equals one if a company belongs to a small group, i.e., a group which has up to five affiliates(FIRMC1≤5) and zero otherwise, FIRMC2 equals one if a company belongs to a medium sized group (5<FIRMC2≤12) and zero otherwise and FIRMC3 equals one if a company is affiliated with a large group (FIRMC>12), else zero. Table 3 reports comparisons of firm valuation, profitability, and the relevant control variables for the sample firms. The results show that, although group affiliated (GA) firms exhibit higher valuation, they are, on average, less profitable than stand-alone (SA) firms. The differences appear to be economically important, as well. For example, the adjusted Q for GA firms is 0.90, which exceeds that for SA firms. On the other hand, the profitable levels for SA firms are roughly double those for GA firms, on average.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Baseline results
[Table 3]
These univariate tests do not control for factors than might systematically impact firm performance.
For one, we do not account for firm-specific controls. More generally, firm performances are likely to differ across industries and over time.
We control for the factors mentioned above in a multivariate regression framework. Measures of firm performance are regressed on the firm-level controls, including logarithm of firm sales (Sales), growth in sales (Gr Sales) and leverage (leverage).
Accordingly, the regression specification for firm i at time t is specified as:
where the concerned performance measure is regressed on a set of firm-level controls. Our coefficient of interest is DGROUP, a dummy variable which assumes value one for firms belonging to a business group, else zero. If group affiliation has a positive effect on firm performance, the coefficient on this variable would be positive.
In Table 4 , firm size and sales growth have positive effect on firm value, whereas the effect of leverage is negative. More importantly, we find a positive performance effect of group affiliation. Group affiliation raises firm value by 0.01; the impact on profits is lower. Both these effects are significant at conventional levels.
[ Table 4 ]
We proceed by investigating how group diversity and group size affect the performance of group affiliates. As for group diversity, we include in our model, following Khanna and Palepu (1997) , the number of industries in a group to which a firm is affiliated, INDSC and (INDSC) 2 , to allow for non-linearities in the relationship between diversification and firm performance. The evidence in Table 5 indicates that diversification initially lowers firm valuation but increases subsequently, consistent with Khanna and Palepu (1997) . The inflection point in the relationship with firm valuation as the dependent variable is 6.9 4 This convex quadratic relationship suggests that as group diversification increases, the marginal value of firm value diminishes, suggestive of a diversification discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Laeven and Levine, 2007) . The retardation in firm value reverses once INDSC crosses a threshold, leading to a beneficial effect of diversification of valuation. The results are similar when RoA is the dependent variable, the estimated inflection point is close to that obtained in case of adjusted Q. Group size exerts a perceptible influence on valuation, since the coefficient on FIRMC is significant in Model 2: group size raises valuation by roughly 0.01.
To see whether the results are robust to changes in the way we measure differences in group characteristics, we proceed by replacing the group dummy in (1) by dummies indicating different classes of group diversity and group size, consecutively. Models 3-4 report the results with adjusted Q as dependent variable; the results with RoA as dependent variable are reported in Models 8-9.
[ Table 5 ]
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper analyzes the effect of group affiliation on firm value for a sample of Indian companies for the period 1996-2006. After controlling for the differences in firm size, growth opportunities and leverage, the findings indicate that group affiliation exerts a salutary impact on firm performance, measured in terms of adjusted Q or RoA.
According to the expropriation view, business groups benefit primarily the controlling shareholder.
Although we cannot directly test this prediction, we do not find that group affiliation lowers performance for companies that are most likely to be the victims of self-interested controlling shareholders. Although tunneling may be a distinctive feature of certain business groups, the results imply that other factors are driving the valuation and profitability effect of group affiliation. Table 2 . Standard errors (allowed for clustering by firm and year) are within parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
